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This article demonstrates how the development of labour market institutions 
alongside economic reform has impacted the human resource management 
(HRM) practices of foreign companies in China. A historical approach is ap-
plied to examine the transformation of China from a centrally planned labour 
administration system to a market-based labour institution. The HRM practices 
of foreign companies are seen being embedded in China's macro-institutional 
environment, which constrains and/or enables foreign companies to exercise 
people management. Drawing on previous research, the study shows that 
HRM practices in the early reform period were primarily constrained both 
by formal and by informal institutions. The evidence from Finnish companies 
operating in China shows that HRM practices in the late reform period are 
largely enabled by formal institutions; however, foreign companies face the 
need for adaptation to the demands of informal institutions. Furthermore, the 
scarcity of human resources and rapid yet heterogeneous socio-economic de-
velopment pose additional challenges for people management in China today.
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Introduction
December 2018 marks the 40th year of China's economic reform. Over 
the past four decades, China has been transformed from a socialist 
planned economy to a socialist market economy.1 China has experi-
enced its fastest economic development since economic reform and 
its opening up to the outside world in 1978. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has been a key driver of this growth. China ranks as the world's 
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second largest country in terms of both FDI inﬂow and attractiveness 
to multinational companies (UNCTAD 2018). Foreign invested enter-
prises already account for 45 per cent of China's exports and imports 
and generate 25 per cent of total industrial proﬁts (Report on Foreign 
Investment in China 2018).
Much research has been conducted into the transformation of China's 
economic system and the subsequent outcomes, such as growth dynam-
ics and economic organization (see Brødsgaard and Rutten 2017). Yet 
few studies have taken a longitudinal approach to examine how the 
institutional transition has inﬂuenced human resource management 
(HRM) practices of multinational corporations (MNCs) over time in 
China. Although some earlier studies have highlighted some changes in 
HRM (e.g. Björkman et al. 2008), these studies typically lack the perspec-
tive of macro-institutional transition. The present study examines the 
changes in HRM practices of foreign companies in China in the context 
of the macro-institutional transition from the early reform period to the 
late reform period, with an emphasis on labour market institutions and 
their subsequent impact on HRM practices, providing a comparison of 
HRM practices between these two periods. 
The notion of formal and informal institutions (North 1990) serves as 
a broad theoretical framework with which to examine the macro-institu-
tions in China during the economic transition. According to North (1990: 
3), institutions are the rules of games in a society or, more formally, the 
human-devised constraints that shape human actions. Formal institu-
tion refers to political and juridical rules, economic rules and contracts, 
while informal institution refers to conventions and codes of behaviour 
where culture is incorporated (North 1990). Hierarchically, formal rules 
range from constitutions to statute and common laws to speciﬁc by-laws 
and ﬁnally to individual contracts (North 1990: 47). These formal and 
informal rules deﬁne what individuals are prohibited from doing and 
under what conditions they are permitted to undertake certain activities. 
Therefore, formal and informal institutions act as a framework within 
which human interactions take place. A major role of institutions is to 
reduce uncertainty and thus provide stability for human interactions. 
Furthermore, in the absence of formal rules, informal rules can play a 
greater role in coordinating human interactions. For example, personal 
relationships among managers in China served as informal substitutes 
for formal institutional support, allowing enterprises to grow in the 
absence of market economy institutions (Peng and Heath 1996). 
Prior to economic reform, China was a typical centrally planned 
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economy. A fundamental feature of such a system is that economic 
transactions are undertaken and coordination among economic play-
ers is achieved by means of bureaucratic control. The central planning 
bureaucracy as a formal institution plays many key roles in the establish-
ment and liquidation of ﬁrms, management of production, allocation of 
products and materials, decisions on pricing, investment, technology 
and foreign trade, appointment, promotion and dismissal of managers, 
and allocation and management of labour (Peng 2000). For instance, 
workers were assigned and paid according to centralized reward scheme 
determined by the labour administration organ. Workers were entitled 
to lifetime employment, and managers had little discretion to discipline 
workers (Tung 1982; Walder 1989). The economic reform has gradually 
transformed such a central labour management system to the current 
market based labour system. Foreign enterprises are seen being embed-
ded in the macro-institutional environment that constrain and/or enable 
them to exercise desired people management practices.
The structure of this article is organized as follows: after the introduc-
tion, the context of China's economic reform is presented. It continues 
with a discussion about the evolution of labour market institutions, fol-
lowed by the institutional environment and HRM practices in the early 
reform period and then the later reform period. The article concludes by 
highlighting the changes in HRM practices at foreign MNCs between 
the two periods of economic reform. 
The analysis of HRM practices in the early reform period is based on 
published empirical studies, whereas that of the later reform period is 
based on the interviews undertaken for two research projects that took 
place between 2005 and 2011 (Kettunen et al. 2008; Lu 2014).2 
The Context: Macro-Institutional Transition in China
Economic reform in China has been typically described as having the 
Chinese characteristics of pragmatism, gradualism, experimentalism 
and incrementalism. Deng Xiaoping, the advocator and pioneer of the 
reform, vividly described this with a famous slogan about a black cat 
and a white cat: 'It does not matter if it is a black cat or a white cat. It is 
a good cat if it can catch the mouse.' 
Economic reform ofﬁcially commenced with the Third Plenary Ses-
sion of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in 1978. Unlike Eastern and Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, which initially launched a rapid and massive privatiza-
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tion programme of state enterprises, economic reform in China started 
in the agricultural sector. The 'household contractual responsibility 
system' (jiating lianchan chengbaozhi) was initiated in rural areas in 1978 
and soon spread all over the country (Chai 1998). By the end of 1984, 93 
per cent of China's cultivated land had been contracted to households, 
and 100 per cent of rural villages had chosen to ﬁx production quotas 
on a household basis (Chen 1995: 23). The People's Communes, a col-
lective mode of agricultural production, were replaced by individual 
household farming. This new system greatly motivated the peasants 
to produce more crops and other agricultural produce. This phase was 
termed by the Chinese government as 'socialist planned economy with 
assistance of market force'. 
The reform shifted to the industrial sector in 1984 (Chai 1998) when 
two important policies were introduced. In May 1984 the State Council 
promulgated the 'Provisional Regulations on Further Expanding the 
Autonomy of the State-Owned Industrial Enterprises' (State Council 
1984); and in the same year the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth 
Central Committee of the CPC passed the Decision on Economic Reform 
that stated that a socialist economy is a planned commodity economy 
based on public ownership (CPC 1984). This latter is the ﬁrst ofﬁcial 
recognition of a commodity economy and indicated the Communist 
Party's desire to gradually dismantle the central planning system. Early 
industrial reform focused on expanding the autonomy and restoration 
of ﬁnancial incentives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The former 
means decentralizing economic activities while the latter means proﬁt 
retention. Procurement of materials under planning allocation was 
reduced. Enterprises began to purchase part of their raw materials via 
market channels. Investment decisions began to decentralize to local 
governments and further down to the enterprises. Financing sources 
were also enlarged to loans from banks and investment by domestic 
and foreign enterprises (Chai 1998).
One key form of the industrial reform that took place was the 'enter-
prise contractual responsibility system' (qiye chengbao jingying zerenzhi), 
which was borrowed from the successful household responsibility sys-
tem used in agricultural reform and introduced to SOEs in 1987 (OECD 
2005). The other was leasing out small and medium-sized SOEs. The 
objective of SOE reform was to separate the ownership right and op-
erations right to an appropriate degree; in other words, the enterprises 
were still owned by the state but were operated by managers. A third 
important issue was the separation of state administration from the 
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operation of enterprises. With these measures, enterprises started to 
bear responsibility for their proﬁts and losses. In 1986 the Provisional 
Law on Bankruptcy was passed for SOEs (NPC 1986). This was the ﬁrst 
enterprise law concerning SOEs since 1949. Under it, SOEs were ofﬁ-
cially recognized as economic entities that take responsibility for their 
own operation and economic results. This period also experienced the 
emergence and rapid growth of the private sector. During 1984–91, the 
growth in industrial output was highest in private enterprises (45 per 
cent) and foreign invested enterprises (47 per cent), and lowest in SOEs 
(only 8 per cent) (China net 3 April 2003). A number of laws relating to 
self-proprietorship (getihu) and private enterprises were introduced as 
well, signalling further development toward a market economy. 
The Fourteenth CPC Congress in 1992 marked a new era of economic 
reform. The Congress decided that the goal of economic reform was to 
establish a 'socialist market economy' (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji) and 
that all enterprises should enter into and compete in the market. With 
this, the concept of market economy was ofﬁcially recognized for the 
ﬁrst time. The Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth CPC in 1993 set 
out the transformation of the operational system and establishment of 
a modern enterprise system as the targets of SOE reform. In 1993 the 
ﬁrst Company Law was introduced (NPC 1993). This came to govern 
all types of enterprises, indicating a shift to the market coordination 
of economic activities in all sectors. The Fifteenth Congress, in 1997, 
called for acceleration of the marketization (shichanghua) of the national 
economy as an important target. Market mechanisms were increasingly 
applied in many economic activities, for example the commodity market 
and the capital market. At enterprise level, this marked the beginning 
of a massive restructuring of SOEs. Their marketization meant restruc-
turing enterprise ownership, transforming SOEs into stock companies, 
establishing a market operation mechanism within SOEs and inducing 
them to compete in the market. The goal was to retain the large SOEs 
and let go of the small and medium-sized ones. Most SOEs lost their 
support, subsidies or free loans from the government and began to strive 
for proﬁtability in order to survive in the market. As a result, a huge 
number of small and medium-sized SOEs were merged, restructured, 
acquired or allowed to go bankrupt (Yusuf et al. 2006).
The later reform of SOEs focused on their transformation into stock 
companies, which took place from the early 1990s and throughout the 
2000s (People net 10 Janaury 2009). The experiment with 100 large SOEs 
began in the mid-1990s (China net 3 April 2003). State ownership was 
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transformed into tradable stock. Governments at central, provincial 
and municipal levels became owners of stock in SOEs. Some stock 
companies were later listed on the stock exchanges in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai. The Third Plenary Session of the Fifteenth CPC Congress in 
1998 further deﬁned China's economic system as being mainly based on 
public ownership but with the coexistence of multi-ownerships. 
Private ownership in enterprises was ofﬁcially accepted as part of 
the national economy in 1988. The Constitution Amendment in 1999 
explicitly recognized private ownership for the ﬁrst time since 1949 (NPC 
1999). The 2004 Constitution was amended to further guarantee the right 
to own private property (NPC 2004). This series of ofﬁcial recognitions 
of private ownership and private property were important steps and 
landmarks in the development towards a market economy. 
Emergence and Establishment of Labour Market 
Institution
The pre-reform labour system was characterized by the so-called three 
irons: iron bowl (tiefanwan, lifetime employment), iron wage (tiegongzi, 
ﬁxed wage) and iron chair (tiejiaoyi, permanent position). Labour was 
assigned according to quotas that were deﬁned and allocated by the 
administration authority of the enterprise. In other words, the enterprise 
had to obtain a labour quota (zhaogong zhibiao) if it wanted to hire people. 
Cadres (ganbu) could keep their positions as long as they followed the 
Communist Party line. There was also a rule called replacement (dingti), 
which meant children were entitled to replace their parents when the 
parents retired. Furthermore, there was strict control over the mobility 
of the population, especially from rural to urban areas. This control 
was administrated by the hukou (residence registry) system that tied 
individuals to their place of birth. This centralized labour system was 
part of the central planning regime. 
In the mid-1980s, when economic reform shifted from agriculture 
to industry, economic activities were increasingly conducted based 
on a market mechanism. These changes required a market-supportive 
labour system. Enterprises were granted some freedom in hiring and 
ﬁring thanks to the above-mentioned central government policy entitled 
'Provisional Regulations on Further Expanding the Autonomy of State-
Owned Industrial Enterprises' of 1984, which covered in ten operational 
areas: production planning, product sales, product pricing, material 
purchasing and labour issues (e.g. deﬁning wage level) among others 
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(State Council 1984). Since 1985, the labour quotas for most large and 
medium-sized SOEs were no longer ﬁxed but were allowed to ﬂuctu-
ate according to the production output volume (Chai 1998). For small 
enterprises under a contractual or leasing system, labour quotas were 
completely abolished. Enterprises started to experience a degree of 
freedom in hiring and ﬁring. Nevertheless, this right remained largely 
theoretical in the 1980s, because it was difﬁcult to enforce in state en-
terprises (Chai 1998). As a result, the free movement of labour, which 
is the prerequisite of a labour market, was much constrained. One key 
factor behind this was that SOEs continued to play the role of danwei (or 
work unit), a mini welfare state.3  Workers still relied on their work unit 
to provide housing, medical care, children's schooling and other social 
services. Another reason was that the state still controlled a considerable 
part of the labour supply. Even in 1992, one-third of the new employ-
ment in SOEs was assigned by the government, with two-thirds being 
recruited by the enterprises themselves (Chen 1995). A third reason 
was that the hukou system prevented people from moving between cit-
ies and regions, especially from rural to urban areas and from smaller 
towns to larger cities. 
It was the deep reform of SOEs from the late 1980s to the early 1990s 
that eventually triggered the emergence of a labour market in China. 
SOEs were undergoing massive restructuring. Under the pressure of 
survival in the market, they began to seek efﬁciency. Not only did they 
have to reduce their workforces, but they also had to shut down un-
proﬁtable enterprises.4 The quota for recruiting staff in state enterprises 
was eventually abolished in the mid-1990s, and thereafter SOEs could 
freely hire workers (Knight and Song 2005).
The introduction of a labour contract system was an important step in 
transforming the centrally planned labour system into a labour market 
institution. As early as 1986 a labour contract was introduced to SOEs 
for the hire of new workers with the State Council 'Provisional Regula-
tions on the Use of Labour Contract in State Owned Enterprises' (State 
Council 1986). However, this implied that a labour contract was applied 
only to a small number of workers because the majority of workers 
were already employed. Yung and Hong (2008) show that only 6 per 
cent of the employees in Shenzhen, one of the most developed areas 
in terms of reform, had a labour contract in 1990. In 1992 the contract 
employment policy was extended to all employees in SOEs (Goodall 
and Warner 1997). 
The Labour Law that was promulgated in 1994 and enacted in 1995 
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legally deﬁned the right of enterprises to hire and ﬁre at national level 
(NPC 1994). The law uniﬁed various regulations and decrees that had 
applied to enterprises with different ownership structures and referred 
to different labour issues. Labour contracts became a legal requirement 
for all companies. The Labour Law was the ﬁrst labour legislation at 
national level that embraced comprehensive issues on employment 
(Warner 1995). It can be regarded as the landmark for the establishment 
of a labour market institution in China, because it established an ofﬁcial 
system that aimed to safeguard, via a market-based mechanism, the free 
mobility of the labour force and enterprise autonomy in decisions relat-
ing to labour on the one hand, and to protect the interests of workers 
and employers on the other hand. 
The Institutional Environment for Foreign Companies 
during the Early Reform Period 
While Chinese SOEs were still operating under the regime of state alloca-
tion of labour resources, lifetime employment and a centrally controlled 
wage system, foreign enterprises were introduced to regulations that 
had some market economy features as early as 1980. The 'Provisions on 
Labour Management in Chinese–Foreign Equity Joint Ventures' that was 
promulgated in 1980 by the State Council was the ﬁrst state regulation 
on labour management for foreign enterprises (State Council 1980). The 
Provisions permitted joint ventures (JVs) to manage their employees in 
recruiting, dismissal, remuneration, labour protection and labour insur-
ance through a labour contract. However, the Provisions also set out a 
number of restrictions in hiring, ﬁring and setting wages. For example, 
the labour contract in JVs had to be approved by provincial govern-
ments; JVs were to recruit employees recommended by the Chinese 
partner's administration organization, a government bureau; recruiting 
from other channels had to be approved by the labour authority; the 
JV's wage was to be set at 120 to 150 per cent of the SOEs in the same 
sector of the region/area; and dismissal for breaking company rules 
with an economic consequence had to be approved by the industrial 
bureau and labour authority. Furthermore, the chairman of the board 
of directors, the highest decision-making authority in a JV, had to be a 
Chinese person from its Chinese partner. 
Along with the relaxation of policy on foreign investment, the regu-
lations on labour issues for foreign companies were relaxed in the late 
1980s. Many of the restrictions mentioned above were removed. One 
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important decree was a circular issued by the General Ofﬁce of the State 
Council in 1988 regarding the approval and transmission of proposals 
submitted by the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Personnel concern-
ing further implementation of the policy that granted decision-making 
powers to enterprises with foreign investment (State Council 1988). 
These regulations allowed foreign enterprises to recruit directly from 
other channels than those provided by the government and from other 
regions than the one in which the company was located, conclude a 
labour contract without approval by the government bureau and dis-
miss employees based on the terms of the labour contract. However, 
the relaxation was not linear and some restrictions were restored later, 
for example regarding the setting of wage levels (Greene 1991; Zhu and 
Dowling 2000). 
This period was characterized by a dual track for labour regulations 
in two senses. First, there were different regulations for Chinese SOEs 
and foreign companies: the former were under the rules of the central 
planning labour system while the latter were under the regulations relat-
ing to the labour market system, as discussed above. Secondly, foreign 
companies operated under the regulations of both systems. 
HRM Practices of Foreign Companies during the Early 
Reform Period
Stafﬁng 
With the restrictions in the early 1980s, as discussed, the main source of 
employees for Chinese-foreign JVs was the Chinese partner. JV was the 
dominant mode of FDI in the early reform period because there were 
many restrictions by the Chinese government relating to the establish-
ment of a wholly foreign owned company. The Chinese partner there-
fore became the natural source of labour. Many SOEs had an excessive 
number of workers, and some were often transferred to the JV when it 
was established. Therefore, this inherited problem of over-stafﬁng was 
partially imposed on the JVs (Verburg 1996). Because the major source 
of labour was internal transfer from the Chinese partner, there was little 
open recruitment. Furthermore, the regulations restricted external re-
cruitment to the local area. Foreign invested companies could hire work-
ers by visiting the local job centre and labour market events organized 
by the local labour authority. The managers of JV were recommended 
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by the Chinese partner or their upper administrative organization, often 
a Communist Party organization. The personnel manager in JVs had to 
be a Chinese person (Verburg 1996). 
At the end of the 1980s, foreign companies were able to hire people 
from outside their location city. Externally hiring employees who were 
not employed by the JV Chinese partner also gained wider acceptance 
(Greene 1991). However, recruiting a person who was fully employed 
by a SOE was difﬁcult in practice (Child 1994). One obstacle was the 
hukou system; the other was the personnel ﬁle (renshi dangan) system. 
Under the central planning regime, a person's personnel ﬁle was kept 
by his/her danwei (work unit). Access to one's own personnel ﬁle was 
forbidden. If an employee changed work unit, the personnel ﬁle had 
to be transferred from the old work unit to the new one unit via in-
ter-work unit transfer. Without the personnel ﬁle, the recipient work 
unit was not allowed to take in the new employee. Holding on to the 
personnel ﬁle was a common means in SOEs for preventing employees 
from changing their job. Even if a foreign company could ﬁnd a suit-
able candidate, it might not be able to complete the recruitment process 
because of this problem (Tsang 1994), and it was a problem that was 
reported to varying degrees by foreign companies. Apparently it was 
not easy to recruit someone from a large SOE or state organization, 
because it was feared that SOEs would lose their best people to foreign 
enterprises. Often, recruiting foreign companies had to resort to help 
from the labour bureau to allow the potential candidate to be released 
from his/her Chinese work unit, and had to pay compensation for this 
to happen (Greene 1991). The transfer procedure was made even more 
complicated if recruitment was taking place across cities or localities. 
As many as 20 approvals could be involved, from, for example, the 
labour bureau, the public security bureau, other civil authorities con-
trolling residence registration and even the recruit's spouse's work unit 
(Tsang 1994). This system prevailed until the 1990s. Today, the role of 
the personnel ﬁle is much less important: foreign and private Chinese 
companies usually do not require one, although the opposite is true for 
SOEs and government organizations.
The ﬁring of unsatisfactory workers was troublesome as well. For 
instance, in an investigation of 30 JVs in 1989, 29 of them encountered 
difﬁculties owing to Chinese managers' protection of their employees 
(Child 1994). This may reﬂect the deeply rooted thinking about life-time 
employment. The entire social system was still that of a central plan-
ning regime, meaning that enterprises were responsible for employee 
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welfare. In the absence of social security, such as unemployment insur-
ance, being unemployed meant losing one's basic income and therefore 
one's livelihood. Therefore, it was not only the mental barrier but also 
the system barrier that prevented ﬁring and laying off. It was reported 
that one way to get rid of excess workers transferred from the Chinese 
partner of the JV was early retirement (Verburg 1996). Towards the end 
of the 1980s ﬁring employees became less difﬁcult, and some foreign 
companies were able to lay off so-called unproductive workers.
Reward
Wages tended to be deﬁned in foreign companies with minimum gaps 
between employees. Large gaps in wages were avoided. There was in-
ternal resistance in JVs, as well as external pressures, against introducing 
individualized incentives that would reﬂect job performance and respon-
sibility levels (Child 1994; Greene 1991). Although the regulations on 
minimum and maximum wage limits for JV employees were abolished 
at the end of the 1980s, external inﬂuence from labour authorities still 
existed until the early 1990s. Greene (1991) reports that a majority of the 
foreign invested enterprises interviewed in 1990 by the US–China Busi-
ness Council indicated that they were pressed to control wage levels. 
Although foreign companies were allowed to use an incentive scheme 
to reward employees whose work was outstanding, bonuses tended to 
be distributed equally to all workers and managers and often became 
part of the basic pay (Laaksonen 1988; Nelson and Reeder 1985; Zhu 
and Dowling 2000). This reﬂected the strong inﬂuence of the egalitarian 
legacy of the central planning regime. In a study of ten foreign–Chinese 
JVs Verburg (1996) ﬁnds that most of them used standard bonuses, such 
as national holiday bonus, proﬁt-sharing and overtime pay; perform-
ance-related pay was applied only marginally in these JVs. Furthermore, 
production targets were often set and measured at group or company 
level. Chinese managers were assessed by the Communist Party and 
labour unions on their political conduct (Child 1994). Chinese manag-
ers and staff were sometimes rewarded by being offered training in the 
home country of foreign partners (Verburg 1996). 
Apart from reward in the form of wages and bonuses, another 
typical material reward was subsidies. As Chinese enterprises still 
bore responsibility for their employees' social welfare, such as housing, 
medical care, daycare and schools, many JVs found that their ability to 
offer attractive housing subsidy is crucial to hiring and retaining good 
employees (Tsang 1994).
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Institutional Environment for Foreign Companies in the 
Later Reform Period
FDI experienced a boom when the policies relating to it were consider-
ably relaxed after Deng Xiaoping's South China Tour in 1992. Foreign 
companies enjoyed preferential policies regarding taxation and import 
tariff, and land and labour use were prioritised for them. Wholly owned 
foreign companies were permitted and gained increasing popularity.
The labour reform reached a historical turning point in the 1990s. 
The Labour Law of 1995 ofﬁcially marked the transition of the centrally 
controlled labour system towards a free market labour institution (NPC 
1994). The law stipulated the labour contract as the means for establish-
ing an employment relationship between worker and company. The 
lifetime employment system, the 'iron bowl', was ofﬁcially abolished. 
The change from lifetime employment to ﬁxed period employment has 
greatly facilitated labour movement. The short-term labour contract has 
become the prevailing employment relationship, especially in private 
and foreign sectors. Labour mobility across cities and regions, especially 
from rural to urban areas, has been rapidly growing since the 2000s 
when the restrictive role of hukou dramatically decreased.
Since the enactment of the Labour Law of 1995, the Chinese labour 
system has undergone rapid liberalization. This has greatly facilitated 
the development of a free labour market but has also largely failed to pro-
tect workers' interests and rights (Gallagher 2004; Wu 2006). This latter 
is primarily because there has been a lack of enforcement of employers' 
obligations to employees, especially thanks to extremely weak surveil-
lance by local governments, who were faced with the need to attract and 
retain investment and grow local economies (Gallagher 2004). Economic 
development has been the priority for both central government and local 
governments since the reforms of 1978. The promotion criteria of local 
ofﬁcials have been measured by regional economic growth. They have 
lacked any incentive to vigorously oversee enterprises' compliance with 
the obligations required by labour regulations. Furthermore, corruption 
on the part of local authorities has also contributed to a lack of enforce-
ment. According to a survey of China's National People's Congress in 
2005, less than 20 per cent of the small and medium-sized enterprises 
used labour contracts (Wu 2006), though this was a legal requirement 
under the Labour Law of 1995.
The number of labour disputes was reported to be ten times greater in 
2005 than it had been in 1995, and 94 per cent of cases were ﬁled by em-
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ployees (Wu 2006). The media frequently reported that employers had 
failed to make wage payments, paid wages below minimum standards, 
evaded social insurance contributions, neglected safety at work, failed 
to make adequate compensation for overtime work or treated workers 
badly. Many disputes erupted into public demonstrations, even riots. 
Against this background, the Labour Contract Law of China was prom-
ulgated in 2007 and came into effect on 1 January 2008 (NPC 2007). 
The core of the Labour Contract Law is to enhance employee protec-
tion by stricter rules for employer obligations and tighter surveillance. In 
fact, the changes between the Labour Law of 1995 and the Labour Con-
tract Law are not that signiﬁcant. Important differences are mainly the 
tightened surveillance and monitoring rules and the forceful campaign 
for worker protection by central government, with massive inspection 
actions being taken by authorities at various levels when the law was 
launched. The major impacts for foreign companies were identiﬁed in 
tightened employment contract terms and legislation relating to dismiss-
als and employee representation (Lu 2009).
Alongside these institutional changes, China has been experiencing 
fast economic growth for over two decades since the 1990s, with an 
annual gross national product growth rate of around 10 per cent. The 
2000s reﬂected a new economic boom until the 2008 world ﬁnancial 
crisis. This continuous fast economic growth resulted in a shortage of 
professionals and specialists, competent managers and skilled work-
ers. Most case companies (see Note 2) reported challenges in ﬁnding 
suitable employees. As one company representative stated, 'It is very 
difﬁcult to recruit people. In recent years there has been overheating 
in this sector. Qualiﬁed professionals were very few' (Interview with a 
Finnish general manager in China, 22 September 2008). 
The increasing lack of skills intensiﬁed the ﬁerce competition for 
talent. The tight labour market further accelerated the inter-ﬁrm mobil-
ity of those employees who were in high demand, namely specialists, 
experienced professionals and managers, because there were many 
opportunities in the labour market for them. 
_________________________________________________________________________65
_______________________________________ Institutions as Constraints and Enablers
HRM Practices of Foreign Companies during the Later 
Reform Period
Recruitment
The early established Finnish companies in China in the mid- to late 
1990s were mostly JVs. Theoretically JVs did not have to recruit staff by 
taking in employees from the Chinese partner owing to the relaxation 
of relevant laws. Nonetheless, some Finnish companies regarded it as 
a quick and easy way to obtain workforce, and in addition Chinese em-
ployees from the Chinese partner often had a good relationship with the 
local customers and authorities. For instance, one Finnish - Chinese JV 
recruited all its workers and staff (about 600) from the Chinese partner 
and only the general manager, ﬁnance manager, technology manager 
and designer came from the Finnish side. However, a few other cases 
were reported as an 'arranged marriage', where the Chinese partner was 
recommended by the Chinese authority. In this situation the transfer of 
Chinese employees was often part of the JV agreement that the Finnish 
partner had to accept. There was one case in which the Finnish partner 
conducted an open recruitment, and eventually no employees from the 
Chinese partner were selected. This caused tension between the Finn-
ish and Chinese partners. A Finnish partner who held a majority share 
could possess greater power in stafﬁng issues, and the terms could be 
altered to favour the Finnish partner.
The use of personal relationships in hiring was common and an 
important means of recruitment when operations began. In a number 
of Finnish companies, the general manager, normally a Finn who was 
responsible for establishing the company, recruited as the ﬁrst Chinese 
manager someone who had been his subordinate in the previous com-
pany in China. Then a few more people were hired through the recom-
mendation of this Chinese manager's friends or acquaintances. The 
management team was then set up. The reason for resorting to personal 
relationships was that Finnish managers had few other options.
From the 2000s onwards, recruitment channels became more diver-
siﬁed. The internet became the most widely used means for recruit-
ing ofﬁce staff and professionals. The case companies reported using 
several popular nationwide recruitment portals, such as www.51job.
com (qiancheng wuyou), www.chinahr.com (zhonghua yingcai) and 
www.zhaopin.com (zhilian zhaopin). Some companies also used the job 
portals for the economic zones in which the companies were located 
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or which were nearby, an example being www.siphrd.com (Suzhou 
Industrial Park Human Resource Development). Recruitment websites 
could also be used by the companies to promote their image. A few of 
them had their name and logo placed on certain recruitment websites 
to promote themselves as attractive employers. The widely spread use 
of the internet as a recruitment channel has increased the openness 
and transparency of the labour market. The availability of human re-
sources can be easily identiﬁed through the internet's assistance, and 
it is a very effective intermediary between potential job candidates 
and companies. 
Recruiting via headhunters is another new method in China, and 
it has been developing very fast in recent years. As reported by some 
case companies, the primary reason for using headhunting companies 
was to identify suitable candidates for high-level managerial roles, as 
well as specialists and some key positions that could not be found on 
the open labour market. For example, one company recruited a quality 
manager via a headhunter: 'Quality manager is a such important posi-
tion that we could not just recruit an unknown person from the market' 
(Interview with a Finnish managing director in China, 2 March 2010). 
In some cases, headhunters were used to assess candidates and check 
their backgrounds, and even to poach potential candidates. The use of 
headhunting services has become increasingly common, largely because 
of the challenge in ﬁnding suitable candidates because of the shortage 
of talent. Most of the case companies used headhunting services to a 
varying extent. With the increasing use of headhunting and the rapid 
spread of the internet, the reliance on personal relationships has de-
creased to a large extent. 
The direct intake of fresh graduates from universities was used by 
some case companies. Recruitment was often targeted to students in 
certain universities that offered degree programmes closely related 
to the professional expertise needed by the company, for example in 
engineering. However, only large Finnish companies could afford such 
a practice, because they needed a relatively large number of such new 
graduates and had the resources to take this route.
Other recruiting channels included job fairs and labour centres. 
There are specialized job fairs for fresh university graduates (yingjieshen 
zhaopinhui). Job fairs were mostly used for recruiting new graduates, 
while hiring operational workers was mainly via local labour centres. 
However, internet portals for recruiting workers have begun to emerge 
in very recent years. 
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Although foreign companies have enjoyed freedom in stafﬁng since 
early and mid-1990s, challenge of recruiting suitable employees has not 
lessened. The reason is the increasing shortage of talent in the labour 
market throughout the mid-1990s to the 2010s. Extensive use of the 
internet, use of headhunters and direct intake from universities and 
colleges were the measures used to tackle this challenge. For instance, 
one company commented, 'Our purpose is to get the maximum number 
of applicants via the internet from whom we can select the best ones' 
(Interview with a Finnish R&D Director in China, 23 September 2008). 
Quite often, there were very few candidates who possessed professional 
knowledge and experience as well as good English skills. 
Reward
The Labour Law not only ofﬁcially dismantled life employment but 
also revoked the egalitarian and seniority-based pay system. The case 
companies reported consistently that they could freely decide the wage 
level and wage structure, and that there was no authority intervention 
into reward issues if the rules regarding minimum wage and overtime 
pay were followed. As the minimum wage standard was considerably 
lower than that of Finland, this regulation was not perceived to be a 
pressure. Labour supply and demand in the market were the key source 
of inﬂuence on company wage levels. The companies reported that they 
had to follow the market price of salaries constantly and adjust their 
wage levels accordingly. Maintaining a competitive salary level is key 
to reducing employee turnover and keeping the workforce stable. The 
consumer price index (CPI) published by the Chinese government was 
regarded as the minimum level for a general annual wage increase. For 
instance, the CPI was 5 per cent in 2008. Ofﬁce staff and managers had 
higher increases in salary, between 10 and 20 per cent annually. For key 
personnel this could be even higher. Salary is not only linked to market 
price but also to performance. 
The larger companies were able to identify the market salary level 
accurately by utilizing the services of multinational consulting compa-
nies, such as Mercer and Hewitt. They could obtain classiﬁed statistical 
information on salary by, for example, industrial sector, geographic 
area and even named competitors. In some companies it was a glo-
bal human resources (HR) policy to use a ﬁxed consulting company 
(often a global company) to provide salary information and to follow 
its grading system, an example being Mercer's international position 
evaluation (IPE), the most popular salary grading system. The smaller 
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companies relied on public sources, such as wage statistics published 
by local governments and the experience of job candidates, who were 
asked to provide the salaries of their current jobs on their application 
form or during an interview. 
In deﬁning individual wage and salary levels, education, profes-
sional qualiﬁcation, work experience, foreign language skill (normally 
English) and level of job demand were all important factors. There was 
clear evidence of a differentiated salary policy in the companies. This 
was competence-based and also served as a mechanism to motivate 
employees, as one Finnish manager commented: 'Those with more 
skills, more experience, of course, should have higher salary than new 
beginners with less experience and so on. Hierarchy is quite important 
to maintain' (Interview with a Finnish general manager in China, 7 
January 2009). The differentiation in reward was also geared to serve 
company strategy. For instance, a market expansion strategy prompted 
companies to make considerable efforts in sales and customer services, 
which were called the 'front line'. Sales personnel had a different bonus 
scheme from other employees. Their bonus was directly linked to sales 
results and could be much more than the average. 'In our company 
the [sales] bonus part is quite big, so our sales people have the highest 
earning in the company, much higher than others' (Interview with a 
Finnish general manager in China, 11 August 2008). The possible side 
effect of this was that engineers hopped to sales jobs, thus worsening 
the shortage of technical professionals.
Some of the case companies had special reward arrangements for 
high potential. For example, one company had a savings plan for highly 
desired employees, who received a certain percentage of extra pay if 
they had worked for three years in the company. In actual fact, this was 
a retention plan that aimed to tackle the high turnover of key person-
nel. Reward together with recruitment and retention were regarded as 
the top three priorities in HRM. One general manager noted, 'People 
always talk about a few things: how you retain employees, how you 
treat employees and how you train employees that they won't run away' 
(Interview with a Chinese general manager, 17 August 2008). 
In general, it was common procedure to implement differentiated pay 
and bonus in the case companies. In addition, there were other bonuses, 
such as attendance bonus, Chinese New Year bonus and a 13th month 
salary. This last was paid to all who had worked for the company for a 
full calendar year. Not all the companies had many bonuses. One inter-
viewee reported that the company had only a year-end bonus based on 
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company results and did not pay a 13th month salary. Another company 
had just begun to implement a bonus policy although it had operated 
in China for several years. In fact, there was only a small number of 
companies that had a variety of bonuses.
Performance-based Pay
A performance-based bonus system was widely applied in the case com-
panies. Workers' bonuses were locally based. They were linked to key 
performance indicators (KPI) and evaluated monthly, quarterly or bi-
annually. 'There is [a bonus] in Finland, but it's not based on the factors. 
It's based on sales turnover and proﬁt. It is totally different. We would 
like to have a system linked more directly to the performance in China' 
(Interview with a Finnish general manager in China, 19 September 2008). 
The maximum bonus was normally around 20 per cent of the wage, and 
the actual ﬁgure paid depended on the performance evaluation result. 
The bonus for managers (usually top managers) was linked to the ﬁnan-
cial results of the company. When yearly targets were met, managers 
could receive a bonus according to the preset percentage in the annual 
budget plan, which was agreed with the parent company. In the larger 
companies there was often a global bonus scheme covering managers 
at higher levels. Normally it was partly linked to the corporate result 
and partly to the Chinese subsidiary result. The maximum percentage 
varied from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the annual salary. 
Very differently from the situation in the early reform period, when 
egalitarianism was the mainstream thinking, case companies reported 
that employees with good performance wanted to be recognized with 
higher ﬁnancial reward and distinguished from those who had per-
formed more poorly. An HR manager noted, 'Performance appraisal 
must be linked to ﬁnancial reward and beneﬁts; otherwise it does not 
make much sense. Furthermore, it should be linked to training oppor-
tunities and employee personal development' (Interview with a Chinese 
HR manager, 18 September 2008). Indeed, many case companies linked 
bonuses either to individual or to both individual and group perform-
ance. Performance appraisal was also attractive to employees, because 
they saw the developmental discussion as a chance to gain access to 
training and thus advance their career.
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Conclusion: Institutions as Constraints and Enablers
This study has examined the changes in the HRM practices of foreign 
companies alongside the economic reform that has taken place in China 
since 1978. It demonstrates that HRM is tightly embedded in the institu-
tional environment where multinational companies operate. In the early 
period of reform, although labour regulations for foreign enterprises 
allowed them to enjoy, to some extent, autonomy in employment prac-
tices, for example hiring people and deﬁning wages, at the same time 
they were restricted in hiring (e.g. locally based hiring and approval 
of labour contract) and setting wage levels. This was due to the overall 
restrictive formal framework, which was still largely maintained by 
the centrally controlled labour administration. In addition, informal 
institutions such as egalitarian thinking among Chinese employees and 
managers, authority intervention into wage issues and the retaining 
of personnel ﬁles by SOEs acted as constraints on foreign enterprises 
to conduct desirable people management practices. These norms and 
work culture (informal institutions) were the legacies of the formal rule 
of China's socialist planned economy (North 1990). 
In the later reform period, the relaxation of labour market institutions 
not only permitted but also encouraged foreign enterprises to pursue 
their preferred HRM practices. For instance, evidence from the Finnish 
companies shows that they are now able to conduct open recruitment 
by using various channels and applying Western selection procedures 
and assessment tools, as well as widely exercising differentiated reward 
policies based on performance, job demand and responsibility, experi-
ence and skills. Some other studies (e.g. Sanyal and Guvenli 2000; Walsh 
and Zhu 2007) show similar ﬁndings. The formal institution of the labour 
market in China much resembles liberal market economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001), where general skills are formed primarily outside ﬁrms 
in educational institutions and are highly portable across companies.
Although the formal institutional environment in the later reform 
period enables foreign companies to carry out desired HRM practices, 
the need for local adaption has not reduced. Legacies of the centrally 
planned economy, such as an egalitarian philosophy, that prevailed in 
the early reform period have dramatically decreased. Yet individualist 
values and a new informal institution, characterized by emphasizing 
material reward and career progression, have emerged and become 
prevalent, especially among younger generations who were born dur-
ing the age of reform, namely in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The Chi-
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nese labels of 'post-70s' (qilinghou), 'post-80s' (balinghou), 'post-90s' 
(jiulinghou) and 'post-00s' (linglinghou) vividly capture the fast pace 
of generational change: a new generation emerges every decade. The 
1980s and 1990s generations represent young people who are highly 
mobile and seek individualist achievement, and at the same time value 
a good work environment. Foreign companies have to adapt their HRM 
practices to meet the demand of new cultural norms. In addition, the 
fast-changing environment in legislation, heterogeneous socio-economic 
development across the country and the highly competitive labour 
market all add complexity for foreign companies involved in people 
management in China. 
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NOTES
1  The terms 'socialist planned economy' and 'social market economy' (used later) are 
adopted from the Chinese government's ofﬁcial terminologies.
2  Personal interviews were conducted between 2005 and 2010 with 61 Finnish com-
panies in various sectors (e.g. machinery, equipment, metal, paper, engineering and 
electronics) that were operating in China. The interviewees included managers and 
business executives of these companies, and they were Finnish and Chinese nation-
als.
3  Danwei have played a pervasive role in China's urban society, binding their employ-
ees to them in a culture of dependence. With their many functions, they are not just 
a workplace but a social institution. They satisfy the basic needs of their employees 
and their dependants, represent their interests, deﬁne their social status, accord 
them various rights, and control and inﬂuence their behaviour (Knight and Song 
2005: 27).
4  It was reported that China's coal industry laid off 187,000 workers in the ﬁrst half 
of 1993 (South China Morning Post International Weekly, 9–10 October 1993).
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